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The Experience Trap 
 
As projects get more complicated, managers stop learning from their 
experience. It is important to understand how that happens and how 
to change it. 
by Kishore Sengupta, Tarek K. Abdel-Hamid, and Luk N. Van Wassenhove 
If you were looking for an experienced manager to head up a software 
development team, Alex would be at the top of your short list. A senior 
manager, Alex has spent most of his career running software projects. His 
first responsibility was developing scientific software for NASA, and since 
then, he has overseen ever more complex projects for commercial 
enterprises and government agencies. 
Alex was typical of the several hundred project managers who participated in 
our research initiative on experience-based learning in complex 
environments. We invited him to test his skills by playing a computer-based 
game that entails managing a simulated software project from start to 
finish—making the plans, monitoring and guiding progress, and observing the 
consequences. We set goals for him: finish on time and within budget, and 
obtain the highest possible quality (as measured by the number of defects 
remaining). 
Alex’s decisions and outcomes were representative of the group as a whole. 
He started with a small team of four engineers and focused mostly on 
development work. That tactic paid off in the short run. The team’s 
productivity was high and development progressed quickly. However, when 
the size of the project grew beyond initial estimates, problems cropped up. 
Because Alex still chose to keep the team small, the engineers had to work 
harder to stay on track. Consequently, they made many mistakes and 
experienced burnout and attrition. Alex then tried to hire more people, but 
this took time, as did assimilating the new hires. The project soon fell behind 
schedule, and at that point Alex’s lack of attention to quality assurance in the 
early phases started to show up in snowballing numbers of software errors. 
Fixing them required more time and attention. When the project was finally 
completed, it was late, over budget, and riddled with defects. 
After the game, we asked Alex to reflect on the simulation. Did the project’s 
growth take him by surprise? Was he shocked that the number of defects 
was so high or that hiring became difficult to manage? Alex—like most of his 
fellow participants—replied that such surprises and shocks have, 
unfortunately, become regular occurrences in most of the projects in which 
he’s been involved. 
Quality and personnel headaches are not what most companies expect when 
they put seasoned veterans like Alex in charge of important projects. At this 
stage of their careers, they should know how to efficiently address 
problems—if not prevent them altogether. What we discovered in our 
experiments, however, was that managers with experience did not produce 
high-caliber outcomes. In our research, we used the simulation game to 
examine the decision processes of managers in a variety of contexts. Our 
results strongly suggest that there was something wrong with the way Alex 
and the other project managers learned from their experiences during the 
game. They did not appear to take into account the consequences of their 
previous decisions as they made new decisions, and they didn’t change their 
approach when their actions produced poor results. 
Our debriefings indicated that the challenges presented in the game were 
familiar to the participants. We asked them to rate the extent to which the 
game replicated their experiences on real-life projects on a scale of 1 to 5, 
where 5 meant “completely.” The average score was 4.32, suggesting that 
our experiments did accurately reflect the realities of software projects. So, 
though the managers had encountered similar situations on their jobs in the 
past, they still struggled with them in the simulations. We came to the 
conclusion that they had not really learned from their real-life project work, 
either. 
In the following pages we’ll identify three likely causes for this apparent 
breakdown in learning, and we’ll propose a number of steps that 
organizations can take to enable learning to kick in again. 
Why Learning Breaks Down 
When anyone makes a decision, he or she draws on a preexisting stock of 
knowledge called a mental model. It consists largely of assumptions about 
cause-and-effect relationships in the environment. As people observe what 
happens as a result of their decisions, they learn new facts and make new 
discoveries about environmental relationships. Discoveries that people feel 
can be generalized to other situations are fed back, or “appropriated,” into 
their mental models. On the face of it, the process seems quite scientific—
people form a hypothesis about a relationship between a cause and an effect, 
act accordingly, and then interpret the results from their actions to confirm 
or revise the hypothesis. The problem is that the approach seems to be 
effective only in relatively simple environments, where cause-and-effect 
relationships are straightforward and easily discovered. In more complex 
environments, such as software projects, the learning cycle frequently breaks 
down. In the experiments we carried out with our study participants, we 
identified three types of real-world complications that were associated with 
the cycle’s breakdown. 
Time lags between causes and effects. 
In the real world, there are delays between causes and effects, and it may 
become difficult to link them, let alone specify the relationship between 
them. To see how project managers cope with this issue, we asked 
participants in our research to play a simulated game in which they managed 
a medium-size satellite-software development project that grew significantly 
in size as more product requirements were added. Each participant had to 
oversee the project in one of four operating environments we’d created, 
which varied in terms of the time that lagged between a decision to hire and 
the arrival of new team members, and between the team members’ arrival 
and their assimilation. Participants had to make a decision on the staffing 
level of the team every two months in a project that took around 18 months 
to complete. We then assessed managers’ ability to handle time lags, by 
comparing their hiring decisions both with the decisions made by a 
theoretical naive manager who never accounted for time lags and with the 
decisions made by a theoretical perfect manager who always did. 
Regardless of the hiring and assimilation delays in their respective project 
environments, all participants made more or less the same decisions as our 
naive benchmark. That shows they were unable to incorporate the effects of 
time lags into their planning decisions and suggests their mental models 
were based on a simple environment in which there was little or no delay 
between a decision and its result. The length of the lag mattered: 
Participants in environments with longer hiring and assimilation delays had 
more difficulty coping than participants who experienced shorter delays. The 
type of lag was also material: Subjects had greater difficulty handling 
assimilation delays, which are much less visible than hiring delays. The 
ability to manage lags deteriorated sharply—and disproportionately—when 
subjects were required to manage long hiring lags followed by long 
assimilation delays. Subjects working under those conditions incurred 83% 
more effort (in personnel time) and took 40% longer to complete the project 
than those making decisions in the low hiring- and assimilation-delay 
environments. 
Interestingly, in many cases the participants decided to hire more staff late 
in the project, which ran counter to what they later said managers ought to 
do. In postgame debriefings we asked subjects to describe appropriate hiring 
policies to adopt when projects ran late. Most of the experienced managers 
stated that they would refrain from hiring and look to other options such as 
reframing the project, zeroing in on a few key priorities, or extending the 
deadline for completion. However, that was clearly not what they actually 
did. In a follow-up experiment where participants managed a second project 
after the debriefing, the same behavior persisted: Those managing projects 
with long time lags still hired more staff late in the project. This suggests 
that even when people had or acquired knowledge, they did not necessarily 
learn how to act on it. 
Fallible estimates. 
In software development, initial estimates for a project shape the trajectory 
of decisions that a manager makes over its life. For example, estimates of 
the productivity of the team members influence decisions about the size of 
the team, which in turn affect the team’s actual output. The trouble is that 
initial estimates usually turn out to be wrong. 
To see how managers handle fallible estimates, we conducted another 
experiment. In it, we examined a cycle of decisions wherein managers 
received initial estimates of the project team’s productivity and were then 
asked periodically to provide their assessment of the team’s actual 
productivity, based on progress made. Each manager got one of three initial 
estimates of how many tasks the team would accomplish per person per day. 
One estimate was low, one medium, and one high—reflecting the wide range 
of values that different estimation tools can produce for the same project. 
The managers had to provide updated estimates of the team’s productivity at 
three points during the game: the end of the design phase (fifth month), the 
middle of the coding phase (10th month), and the end of the coding phase 
(15th month). At each point, the managers received progress reports on the 
project’s status with new estimates of productivity and were advised to 
review them before providing their own estimates of the team’s productivity. 
The participants were told that their productivity estimates would be used for 
making the adjustments to the project’s staffing levels and schedules. In 
reality, however, the game disregarded the estimates. The idea was to give 
all subjects identical status reports, so we could compare how people’s 
productivity estimates evolved over time. Our hypothesis was that people’s 
productivity estimates would converge (people starting with low estimates 
would raise them over time and those with high estimates would lower 
them). 
So what happened? The managers’ productivity estimates did not converge 
over time. What’s more, there was a clear bias toward conservativeness: All 
their estimates drifted downward. That was true not only for managers given 
high initial productivity estimates but also for those whose initial estimates 
were low. And when faced with two estimates of productivity (their previous 
estimate and the new number provided by the status reports), they accorded 
greater weight to the lower of the two figures in revising their estimates. We 
suspect that this conservatism can be explained by managers’ attempts to 
game the system to get more resources. 
 
 
Initial goal bias. 
Project managers usually begin with a set of goals related to cost, time, and 
other factors. But most projects change in scope or encounter the 
unexpected, which frequently renders early targets obsolete. When that 
happens, managers need to revise their targets accordingly. 
 
Cognitive Feedback in Complex Projects 
This chart shows managers that there’s a long lag between an effect, the number defects 
caught in a software development project, and its cause, hiring additional quality assurance 
staff. The two lines indicate a 20-day lag between the time the QA team reaches full strength 
and its full effectiveness at catching defects. The chart also suggests that the team may be 
able to reduce the QA staff after day 60, when the rate at which defects are found drops, 
which most likely indicates that the team has become experienced and is making fewer 
mistakes. Armed with such data, managers can make better staffing decisions. The connection 
between cause and effect is clearer when you have the feedback in this form: visual, 





To see if managers did amend their targets in response to changes in scope, 
we asked two different groups of subjects to manage a project that increased 
substantially in requirements. Each group received an initial set of two 
targets. The “cost group” subjects were asked to stay within budget (944 
person-days of effort) and deliver the product on schedule (within 272 
working days). The “quality group” subjects were asked to deliver the 
product on schedule and with the fewest number of defects. It was clearly 
stated that these were initial targets only, based on information available at 
the time, and that participants’ success would be evaluated on the overall 
outcome. The increase in scope happened a quarter of the way into the 
game. At that point, managers could have opted to revise their initial targets 
by projecting budget or time overruns while sticking to initial quality goals. 
Although we did not ask players to explicitly reevaluate their targets, we 
were careful to leave the possibility open to them. 
Neither group readjusted targets in light of the new information. Instead, 
players in both groups stuck to their original targets, and as a result they all 
failed to achieve an optimal outcome. In an effort to keep costs down to the 
initial target, the cost team made far fewer hires than was ideal and 
sacrificed completion time. Although these players kept the cost overrun 
down to 59%, they took 17% more time to complete the project and their 
number of defects rocketed to 1,950. The quality team, on the other hand, 
employed too many people. The players in this group hit their defect target, 
but they still finished 9% over schedule time and came in a whopping 107% 
over budget. In some cases sticking to initial targets actually created 
counterproductive outcomes. In trying to meet budgets, the “cost group” 
subjects often paid little or no attention to quality assurance. In the process, 
they created so many errors that the effort it took to fix them substantially 
drove up the cost of the project. 
These results suggest that if not explicitly required to reevaluate objectives, 
managers will continue to pursue the targets set at the outset of a project, 
even when events render the targets inappropriate. It’s not hard to see 
where that bias comes from. Very early in their careers, people incorporate 
into their mental models the notion that it’s important to meet externally set 
targets. This bias is often reinforced in managerial life. Revising targets is 
seen as an admission of failure in many companies, and managers quickly 
realize that their careers will fare better if they stick to and achieve initial 
goals—even if that leads to a worse overall outcome. With the bias so firmly 
embedded in the mental model, it’s hardly surprising that it affected decision 
making in our simulation, even though the participants understood that 
success would be measured by the project’s results. 
• • • 
We conclude that managers find it difficult to move beyond the mental 
models that they have developed from their experiences in relatively simple 
environments or that have been passed on to them by others. When 
complications are introduced, they either ignore them or try to apply simple 
rules of thumb that work only in noncomplex situations. What they don’t do 
is materially improve the quality of their mental models to take into account 
the realities of complex projects. This conclusion has two important 
implications for companies that continue to emphasize learning on the job: 
First, the impressive backgrounds of people like Alex will have little bearing 
on their ability to manage complex projects. Many companies routinely find 
that replacing one veteran project manager with another has no impact. 
Despite their experience with complex projects, both managers do not 
meaningfully change the mental models they’ve already formed in simpler 
and usually similar contexts. In some cases, in fact, companies might even 
be better off hiring someone who didn’t have experience. That’s not to say 
that different managers don’t make different decisions or that circumstances 
may not conspire to make a particular project turn out well, or even that a 
few managers aren’t consistently successful over time. The point is that most 
managers, even those with impeccable résumés, fail to turn in consistently 
good, let alone improving, performance on the projects they run. Even when 
managers do consistently better their performance, the improvement is 
probably the result of some subtly different past experience rather than 
systematic and incremental learning from complex projects. 
The second implication is a corollary of the first. If it makes little difference 
whom you put in charge, then managers will end up ascribing responsibility 
for failures not to their own decisions but to some other factor: 
overambitious planning or the demands of the finance department (or—as is 
often the case—a salesperson promising too much to the client and then 
setting unrealistic goals for the project). When that kind of belief takes hold, 
managers start to look in the wrong places for solutions to their performance 
problems. That can be a recipe for disaster. 
Fixing the Experience Learning Cycle 
Although our research indicates the experience learning cycle has broken 
down for most managers of complex projects, it can be mended. There are a 
number of practical steps organizations can take to get managers to start 
learning in complex situations. Some of our recommendations accept the 
deficiencies of the experience learning cycle and involve helping managers 
work around them by supplying other types of learning. Other approaches 
aspire to reduce the deficiencies of the cycle through improved discovery and 
appropriation. Companies that adopt these recommendations will quickly find 
that their ability to improve project-management performance continually 
increases. 
Provide more cognitive feedback. 
Project environments are rich in information, particularly feedback on 
outcome, which is delivered through status reports. But in environments 
where cause-and-effect relationships are ambiguous, outcome feedback is 
not an effective mechanism for discovery or for identifying reasons 
underlying a specific problem. What managers need is feedback that provides 
insights into the relationships among important variables in the project 
environment, particularly as the project evolves. This is called cognitive 
feedback. For an example, see the exhibit “Cognitive Feedback in Complex 
Projects,” which depicts the relationship between the level of quality 
assurance and the rate at which defects are caught in the first 80 days of a 
project. In this case, the manager has chosen to start the project with a 
relatively low level of quality assurance and has increased it over time. The 
rate at which defects are caught increases correspondingly, but with a lag, 
and disproportionately because more effort is now devoted to detection. The 
rate then decreases, signaling that most of the defects are being detected, 
and the manager can now maintain quality assurance at this level or even 
reduce it. While such feedback is not error free, it enables managers to learn 
about complex dynamic relationships. Our research has demonstrated clear 
benefits from it: Managers who were provided with cognitive feedback in our 
simulations showed a deeper understanding of their environments and made 
decisions that resulted in better outcomes. We recommend that companies 
invest in making cognitive feedback a part of regular project status reports. 
What’s more, we’ve found such feedback to be even more effective when 
data from different projects are combined, so that the impact of actions 
across multiple projects can be examined. 
One leading provider of corporate software that we know employs cognitive 
feedback in its development projects. The consensus among executives there 
is that this has helped project managers develop better insights. Their 
decisions also appear to have improved: The proportion of problem projects 
has fallen by 56% in three years, the company calculates. 
Apply model-based decision tools and guidelines. 
Our research consistently demonstrates that managers can’t do adequate 
mental bookkeeping in the dynamic aspects of software project 
management. Bare intuition is not enough: Managers facing decisions need 
the assistance of tools that combine formal models and heuristics. Consider 
staffing decisions. When a manager makes several hires, there is a hiring 
delay and an assimilation delay with each. Over time it becomes difficult for 
the manager to assess current and predict future team productivity, 
especially if the staff suffers attrition. But if the manager is provided with 
tools that can calculate the effects of additions and turnover for several 
periods, he will obtain a clearer picture of the expected cumulative impact on 
team productivity over the medium term. In addition to formal models, such 
tools can contain mechanisms such as trip wires for projects in trouble 
(flagging when a manager should consider reducing scope, for example) or 
rules about the appropriate balance of development work and quality 
assurance at various stages. Our research shows that such tools improve 
decision making and help new managers get up to speed faster. 
A leading provider of software we worked with has an extensive portfolio of 
decision support systems for this very purpose. The firm’s managers can use 
the systems to gauge likely attrition, analyze the effects of new hires on 
team productivity, and get guidance on such questions as whether it is useful 
to hire at all at late stages in the project. The managers that use the decision 
support tools report feeling significantly more in control of their projects and 
demonstrate much better project performance. The company also has one of 
the best reputations for quality in the industry. 
Calibrate your forecasting tools to the project. 
The tools that organizations rely on to generate project estimates should be 
calibrated to the project’s specific context—to the industry, the local 
environment, and the skills of the available staff. Many organizations, 
however, simply import project-management forecasting tools from other 
contexts and other companies. One software company we studied had just 
adopted a tool from an aerospace company. Organizations compound 
estimation problems by basing their model assumptions on data from past 
projects without scrubbing the data first (that is, without accounting for any 
unusual circumstances encountered by those projects). Not surprisingly, the 
resulting estimates tend to be unreliable and have little credibility with 
project managers. When they lack faith in the estimates, project managers 
will rely on their own perceptions and revert to applying rules they’ve 
developed for simple situations. To avoid this, companies must do everything 
they can to instill managers’ faith in the projections, and that means 
customizing forecasting models to project needs and cleaning up the data 
used to drive assumptions and infer relationships. Also, the more managers 
invest in gathering and processing their own data, the better their 
forecasting will become. This is one area in which simplistic “best practice” 
benchmarking from successful project managers can be very dangerous. 
The research and development center of one leading producer of 
semiconductors has developed a way to reduce estimation fallibility. For 
every completed project, the center “normalizes” outcomes in a three-step 
process that identifies unusual events, roughly calculates their impact, and 
then deducts the impact from the results. The scrubbed values then go into 
the estimation models. 
Set goals for behavior, not targets for performance. 
Another weakness of estimation tools is that their projections are usually 
based on product size (for example, how many lines of code or function 
points), which is extremely difficult to predict in the planning stages. 
Moreover, product deliverables can change over time in ways that are 
difficult to anticipate. Thus, initial estimates don’t make good goals. Indeed, 
when so used, they promote inappropriate responses such as ad hoc trade-
offs between cost and quality, and lead to poor outcomes. 
Yet software projects universally employ cost and schedule targets based on 
early predictions. And when managers know they will be measured against 
targets based on unreliable estimates, they seek additional slack by opting 
for “safe” estimates and then proceed to squander the slack through make-
work and by embellishing the project with unnecessary features. There is 
thus a strong case to be made for rethinking the way goals are set. 
In particular, companies need to understand that estimates function best as 
devices for planning and control, and goals as mechanisms for promoting 
desired behavior. We recommend that when they’re establishing goals, 
organizations follow a two-step process: First they should decide on the 
behavior they wish to foster, and then they should set goals that encourage 
such behavior. In a single project, an organization might decide it wants its 
managers to minimize turnover on the project team (doing so can increase 
productivity and learning, and reduce errors). This can then be an explicit 
part of the goal set. To meet that goal, managers would have to formulate 
ways to cushion their teams from schedule pressures and from the impact of 
normal attrition. 
We’ve found that when managers have responsibility for multiple projects, 
their goals should promote behavior that maximizes the success of the 
portfolio (rather than individual projects). In setting such goals, the 
organization must give managers a certain degree of freedom, allowing 
them, for instance, to negotiate trade-offs between scope and schedules to 
preserve team stability or prevent problems from infecting other projects. 
Additionally, to ensure greater commitment, organizations must give 
managers a say in composing the goals. 
Develop project “flight simulators.” 
It’s clear that live projects don’t provide a good learning environment. It is, 
however, possible to construct artificial environments that can be managed 
so that complexity does not overwhelm learning. For an analogy, consider 
the use of flight simulators in aviation. Skills for flying planes are highly 
model-specific: Pilots need to undergo extensive training every time they 
switch models (or even move from, say, a freight version of a Boeing 747 to 
a passenger version). Flight simulators are an essential part of that process. 
Appropriately constructed “flight simulators” can play a similar role in project 
management, as virtual worlds for training and immersion. The need for 
them is especially pronounced because project managers now move across 
organizations more often than they did in the past. Since knowledge has a 
situation-specific (or company-specific) aspect, each time managers change 
companies or work contexts they need to learn about the relationships in the 
new environment, such as which factors drive productivity or quality. We 
suggest a graduated training program, where managers can start with 
lenient environments, in which the relationships to be discovered are simple. 
The trainees would then move through progressively more demanding 
environments, where the relationships become more complex and the 
feedback is less reliable. (That can be engineered by continually increasing 
time lags between causes and effects.) As the trainees progress, we suggest, 
programs should increase their focus on dynamic relationships—such as the 
connection between hiring decisions and quality assurance outcomes—
because these are the ones that are hardest for managers to understand. 
This flight simulator approach worked well for one maker of satellite software 
we worked with. The company has developed a project-management game 
that incorporates the realities of its own environment—such as the factors 
that have the most impact on quality and productivity in its business—and 
successfully mimics the processes and outcomes of actual projects done by 
the company. New managers use the game to learn the essentials of project 
management before taking on project responsibilities. Initial results are 
promising: The managers have shown considerably better insights about the 
dynamic relationships at work in their projects, and the projects’ 
performance has also improved. 
• • • 
The problems with the learning cycle we’ve described are certainly not the 
only breakdowns that occur in learning. Nor do we pretend that our 
recommendations will fix all the problems. But the studies we’ve conducted 
provide compelling evidence that learning on the job simply won’t work in 
any but the most basic environments and that managers can continue 
learning only if they’re given some formal training and decision support 
specifically tailored to the challenges they will face. As it happens, companies 
typically spend training dollars most heavily on entry-level hires and usually 
import project-planning tools wholesale from other companies. Senior 
recruits are expected to hit the ground running and best practices are 
supposed to be just that. These expectations are precisely why so many 
experienced managers fail when they take on new responsibilities. 
Companies would be better advised to leave their junior hires to fend for 
themselves, to focus their training budgets on people higher up the corporate 
hierarchy, and to stop looking for quick fixes from other places. 
 
